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Disaggregating “War”
Derek Jinks
Arizona State University College of Law
Abstract:
This Term, the Supreme Court addressed several important questions regarding
the role of law and legal institutions in the “war on terrorism.” Specifically, the Court
issued important rulings concerning (1) the scope of the President’s war powers; (2) the
rights of enemy combatants; and (3) the proper role of courts in time of war. Much
remains unresolved by the Court’s opinions, but several basic propositions about the legal
concept of “war” are reaffirmed. Presidents enjoy some extraordinary powers in time of
war; the role of the judiciary is diminished in some important respects (but not
extinguished) in time of war; a specialized legal regime, the “law of war,” is activated in
time of war; the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is entitled to substantial deference in
matters directly related to the conduct of war; and in particular, the President enjoys wide
latitude in the treatment of the enemy. These cases present remarkably complex legal
problems because defining “war” (and its legal consequences) is as difficult as it is
necessary. What is a “war”? When does it begin and end? What rules apply in time of
war? What is the proper distribution of institutional authority in time of war?
These questions are presented in acute form in the “war on terrorism.” Indeed, it
is now clear that the September 11 attacks (and the response to them) placed the concept
of “war” under tremendous strain. Consider that the Bush administration has advanced
several controversial claims that turn substantially on the proper meaning of “war.” For
example, the administration characterizes U.S. antiterrorism policy as the “war on
terrorism.” The administration also characterized the September 11 attacks as “acts of
war” triggering the right of self defense under the United Nations Charter. The President
also characterized the attacks as “war crimes”—rendering the perpetrators amenable to
prosecution before ad hoc military commissions. In addition, the rights of several
hundred detainees are sharply delimited, according to the administration, because they
are “enemy combatants”—that is, they took up arms against the United States in time of
war. The administration nevertheless insists that the law of war does not protect these
“combatants” because they do not qualify as “prisoners of war.” Critics, on the other
hand, take issue with each of these claims. Some argue that the United States cannot be at
war with a terrorist network. Others insist that terrorist attacks do not constitute “acts of
war” or “war crimes.” Still others insist that a formal declaration of war is necessary to
activate certain extraordinary presidential powers. And some argue that the law of war
confers substantial legal protection on terrorist fighters captured and detained by the
United States.
Although all these disputes turn on how best to define the existence and legal
consequences of “war,” they each revolve around quite different policy concerns. That is,
the legal concept of “war” is expected to do different kinds of work in each of these issue
areas. Drawing on this point, I argue that “war” should be disaggregated into three

distinct concepts: “armed conflict” –which defines the conditions under which
international humanitarian law is applicable; “armed attack” –which defines the
conditions under which states are entitled to use force in self defense; and “war” proper—
which defines the conditions under which various emergency powers are activated as a
matter of domestic law.
Scholars, litigants, and courts (including the Supreme Court) often conflate these
notions of “war”—invoking policy arguments from one domain in service of a claim
peculiar to another. For example, some proponents of broad presidential war powers
argue that a formal declaration of war is not required to activate extraordinary powers
traditionally confined to “times of war” because the contemporary law of war applies to
all armed hostilities that de facto constitute “armed conflicts.” This claim—which enjoys
a certain surface appeal—is less persuasive when the two strands of war law in play are
disentangled. The low threshold of application for the law of war (or “international
humanitarian law” in contemporary parlance) reflects the principal policy concern
animating this body of law: the under-application of humanitarian principles in the
conduct of organized hostilities. The declaration of war requirement for the activation of
certain emergency powers reflects other policy concerns such as (1) the importance of
providing formal notice to individuals (and perhaps other states) of the existence of a
state of war; and (2) the importance of diffusing formal authority to trigger emergency
powers. The distinctive characteristics of the “war on terrorism” might clearly constitute
an “armed conflict” within the meaning of the law of war, and yet not constitute a “war”
for the purposes of activating a broad range of domestic emergency powers. Moreover,
the “war on terrorism” might “never end” in the sense that international humanitarian law
should govern each and every U.S. military operation (irrespective of where, when, or
against whom the operation is directed). Nevertheless, it might be essential to cabin
temporally the “war”—understood as an authorization to suspend certain aspects of
ordinary law.
The upshot is that disaggregating “war” along the lines proposed here facilitates a
more focused analysis of the war-related legal disputes arising out of the current conflict.
To illustrate this point, I analyze the Supreme Court’s opinions in Hamdi and Rasul in
view of the disaggregation of “war”—emphasizing how the disaggregation model
provides better answers to the pressing questions confronted by the Court.

